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claims. Regarding the first fraud
claim, that Collagen committed fraud
through its representations to the
FDA during the PMA process, the
court upheld its decision finding that
its original decision was unaffected
by Medtronic. Also, the MDA
preempted the claim that Collagen
had committed fraud through
misrepresentations about the product
for the same reasons that the mis-
branding and mislabeling claims were
preempted. Furthermore, even though
the Mitchells'claimed fraud in
advertising and promotional materi-
als, the court held that the claims
must fail because an FDA regulation
controlled Collagen's promotional
materials as part of the PMA process
and was preemptive in the absence of
an allegation that the material was
non-conforming.
Finally, the court granted summary
judgment on the Mitchells' warranty
claim even though the vagueness of
the warranty precluded the court from
determining whether an expressed or
implied warranty was alleged. If an
implied warranty claim had been
intended, the MDA preempted it
because of the warranty's interference
with the standards set by the FDA
during the PMA process. If the
Mitchells had intended to submit an
express warranty claim, the claim
would still fail. Since warranties arise
from the parties themselves as part of
their bargain, the court stated that an
express warranty claim would not
necessarily interfere with the PMA
and warrant preemption. However,
since the Mitchells failed to assert a
proper express warranty claim earlier
in the litigation, they were estopped
from doing so now. Therefore, the
court found summary judgment was
proper.
After reconsidering the
Mitchells' claims in light of
Medtronic, the Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed the district court's
granting of summary judgment to
Collagen on all of the Mitchells'
claims. Specifically, the court held
that the MDA preempts common law
causes of action unless the claims
merely allege non-compliance with
PMA requirements because they
would impose a requirement
"different from, or in addition to"
the PMA process. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court distinguished
Medtronic, holding that it applied
only to products that went through
the "substantially equivalent"
process, as opposed to the PMA
process, which is more specific and
thus within the preemptive scope of
the MDA.
Telemarketing Company Lacked Standing in
Antitrust Suit
By James Saranteas
In Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 118
F.3d 178 (3rd Cir. 1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed a district court
decision holding that an injury
alleged by a pharmaceutical market-
ing company bringing suit was not
the type of injury the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent. Since the
marketing company bringing suit was
not a competitor in the market in
which trade was allegedly restrained,
the marketing company lacked
standing under the antitrust laws.
The Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment dismissing Barton's
antitrust claims for lack of standing
and dismissing Barton's other claims
for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.
Marketing Plan Led to Litigation
The litigation sprung from the
broken pieces of a novel plan that
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. ("Barton"), a
pharmaceutical marketing company,
developed to market Smithkline
Beecham Corporation's
("Smithkline") Hepatitis-B vaccine
("the vaccine") to nursing homes.
Barton developed the marketing plan
in response to an Occupational
Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") mandate that was directed
at certain employers, such as nursing
homes, whose employees could be
exposed to the Hepatitis-B virus. The
mandate required nursing homes to
educate their employees about the
Hepatitis-B vaccine and make the
vaccine available to their employees.
In response to OSHA's regulatory
mandate, Barton developed a two-
part plan for marketing the vaccine to
nursing homes and presented this
plan to Smithkline, which was one of
only two manufacturers of the
vaccine. Barton and Smithkline then
entered into an agreement to put the
marketing program in action.
In the first part of the program,
Barton was to provide nursing homes
with educational and regulatory
material about the vaccine and
Smithkline would pay Barton a flat
fee. Then, Barton was to phone
nursing homes and solicit orders for
the vaccine. Since Barton lacked the
requisite federal licensing to sell the
vaccine, Barton was to give vaccine
orders that it solicited to General
Injectables and Vaccines, Inc.
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("General"), a licensed medical
supply house. General would then
fill the orders Barton solicited from
the nursing homes with the vaccine
from Smithkline. Barton contended
that Smithkline was to pay it a
commission on the sales under this
second part of the program.
Before Barton made any sales,
however, Smithkline discontinued the
marketing program. Nursing homes
traditionally have received medica-
tions and vaccines from consultant
pharmacists. These pharmacists and
their trade associations complained to
Smithkline that Barton's marketing
program bypassed them and undercut
the vaccine prices the pharmacists
could provide to the nursing homes.
Pharmacists complained to
Smithkline and threatened to boycott
Smithkline's products. In reaction to
these complaints, Smithkline
discontinued the marketing program
and reverted to using the pharmacists
to distribute the vaccine.
Barton Alleged Federal Antitrust
Violations and State Law Claims
After Smithkline terminated its
relationship with Barton, Barton
brought suit in federal district court
for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment. Barton also alleged that
Smithkline conspired with the
pharmacists to restrain competition in
the nursing home market for the
vaccine and that this restrained trade
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Thus, Barton
claimed it was entitled to treble
damages under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, for damages
arising under its restraint of trade
claim.
In district court, Smithkline
moved for summary judgment on the
restraint of trade issue. Smithkline
argued that Barton lacked standing
on this claim because Barton was
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neither a competitor nor a consumer
in the nursing home vaccine market.
The district court granted
Smithkline's motion, citing Barton's
failure to show an "antitrust injury."
The district court also ruled that
under the antitrust laws, there existed
other, more direct, victims of the
alleged conspiracy to restrain trade
and that the apportionment of
damages among those injured would
be so complex that it weighted
against finding that Barton had
standing on the antitrust issue.
Therefore, the district court dis-
missed Barton's only federal claim
and declined to use its supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law breach
of contract and unjust enrichment
claims.
On appeal, Barton argued that the
evidence on record showed that
Smithkline, General, and the pharma-
cists all considered Barton to be a
competitor with the pharmacists.
Additionally, Barton argued that case
law supported a finding that it was a
competitor. Thus, Barton contended,
it had standing under antitrust laws.
Antitrust Injury Did Not Create
Antitrust Standing
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §15, contains broad language
in favor of finding a cause of action
under federal antitrust laws. In
deciding whether Barton had
standing to bring its antitrust claim,
the Third Circuit considered Associ-
ated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519
(1983). In Associated, the Court
interpreted the statute under its
narrower, common-law background
which focused on the injury a
plaintiff suffered, and that Court
considered whether antitrust law was
intended to prevent that type of
injury. The Court concluded that
antitrust laws were designed to
redress only those injuries suffered
by a competitor or a consumer in the
market in which trade was allegedly
restrained. The Third Circuit
reasoned that the relevant market in
this case was the nursing home
market for the vaccine and if Barton
was not a competitor in that market,
then Barton did not have antitrust
standing under Associated. The
court reasoned that since Barton
neither sold, nor distributed, nor
sought to sell the vaccine, Barton was
not a competitor in this market and
therefore did not have standing in
this case.
Marketer of Vaccine Program Was
Not a Competitor
Barton argued that the court
defined the "market" incorrectly. In
Barton's view, Barton and its
program competed with the pharma-
cists in the nursing home vaccine
business. The Third Circuit remained
unconvinced. The court reasoned
that although "its program" -
including Barton's marketing,
General's supply, and Smithkline's
development of the vaccine - did,
indeed, compete with the pharmacists
in the nursing home vaccine market,
Barton alone was not a competitor.
In fact, the court noted that the
pharmacists' efforts to terminate the
Barton program was evidence of the
fact that the pharmacists considered
the program a competitive threat.
Furthermore, evidence of the nursing
homes' favorable reaction to Barton's
program showed that the program was
reasonably interchangeable with the
pharmacists' offerings. However, the
court found that this evidence only
showed that the entire program, not
Barton's vaccine marketing alone,
competed with the pharmacists.
To hold for Barton, the court
would need to find that what Barton
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alone offered - and not what
Smithkline, Barton, and General
offered in combination - was
interchangeable with the pharmacists'
offerings. The court reasoned that
since Barton only marketed the
vaccine, nursing homes could not
switch to Barton without dealing
with General because Barton could
not provide the vaccine. Thus,
Barton's services were not inter-
changeable with the pharmacists'
offerings of both information about
the vaccine and the vaccine itself.
Based on this reasoning, the court
concluded that Barton was not a
competitor in the market for sales of
the vaccine.
Vaccine Was Not Merely an
"Additional Input"
Altematively, Barton argued that
even though Barton needed to work
with General to provide the vaccine
to the nursing homes, Barton was not
a competitor of the pharmacists. In
other words, Barton argued that it
should not be excluded as a competi-
tor simply because it needed an
"additional input," the vaccine, to
compete. The Third Circuit acknowl-
edged that other courts have held that
a product that required an "additional
input" should not be excluded from
the relevant market. However, the
court here reasoned that since Barton
was legally barred from providing the
vaccine on its own, the vaccine could
not be described as merely an
additional input. The court, there-
fore, concluded that nursing homes
could not have switched from the
pharmacists to Barton alone, and as
such, Barton was not a competitor in
the relevant market.
Court Rejected Plaintiff's Case Law
Arguments
Barton argued that case law
supported a finding that it was a
competitor in the vaccine market to
nursing homes. For example, Barton
looked to Bhan v. NME Hospitals,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1985),
which favors finding that a party is a
competitor even though it requires
additional input in order for its
product or service to be interchange-
able with other products in the
market. In Bhan, the Ninth Circuit
held that nurse anesthetists and M.D.
anesthesiologists competed in the
same market even though the nurses
required the "input" of a supervising
physician. The Ninth Circuit came to
this conclusion because the supervi-
sion was easily available and
common practice. Unlike the nurses
in Bhan, however, the Third Circuit
found that Barton could not easily
obtain the additional input required.
Barton lacked the requisite prescrip-
tion drug license and was thus legally
prohibited from distributing the
vaccine.
Barton also cited Yellow Page
Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE
Directories Corp., 951 E2d 1158
(9th Cir. 1991), as persuasive case
law supporting its argument that it
could compete with the pharmacists
in the vaccine market without
providing the vaccine itself. In
Yellow, GTE produced phone
directories and sold advertisements in
the directories. Customers could buy
advertisements and consulting
services or simply consulting services
either from advertising companies
("advertisers") or GTE. After GTE
discontinued the practice of allowing
the advertisers to place ads in GTE's
telephone directories, customers
began placing their ads directly with
GTE, thereby circumventing the
advertisers and their services. Even
though the advertisers could still sell
consulting services, they were no
longer allowed to place ads. They, in
turn, lost business due to the
inconvenience customers faced by
not being able to take care of all their
business with one company. The
advertisers brought suit alleging
antitrust violations against GTE.
The Ninth Circuit granted the
advertisers antitrust standing because
the court found that the advertisers
and GTE competed in the market for
yellow-pages advertising consulting
services, however, the court did not
determine whether the advertisers
competed with GTE in the sales of
advertising despite the fact that the
advertisers did not actually sell the
ads, but only information about the
ads. Since the plaintiff in Yellow
actually competed with the defendant
to some degree, the Third Circuit
refused to find that Yellow supported
Barton's argument on appeal.
Therefore, the Third Circuit could
not rely on Yellow to hold that Barton
was a competitor in the nursing home
vaccine market because it had merely
marketed the vaccine.
In sum, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that Barton was not a com-
petitor in the nursing home market
for the vaccine. Since Barton was
not a competitor in the market in
which trade was allegedly restrained,
Barton lacked antitrust standing.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment dismissing Barton's
antitrust claims for treble damages
and dismissing Barton's state law
claims for lack of supplemental
jurisdiction.
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